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Biodiversity valuation and the discount rate problem 
Structured Abstract 
Purpose:  To demonstrate that the application of standard environmental accounting practices 
for estimating long-term discount rates is likely to lead to the rejection of biodiversity-sensitive 
projects that are in the greater societal good.   
Design/methodology/approach:  We combine estimates of marginal ecosystem damages 
from two forestry case studies, one local, one global, with ten different term structures of 
discount rates taken from both the academic literature and policy choices to calculate present 
values.    
Findings:  Standard environmental accounting approaches for estimating the long-term 
discount rate result in the under-valuation of projects that are sensitive to biodiversity 
conservation.   
Research limitations/implications:  This paper is set within a Full Cost Accounting (FCA) 
framework, and therefore has the limitations that generally follow from taking this approach to 
biodiversity problems.  Recommended extensions include looking at broader ranges of 
biodiversity costs and benefits.    
Practical/social implications:  Unless environmental accountants engage with environmental 
economists over the issue of intergenerational discount rates, then it is likely that socially 
responsible managers will reject projects that are in the greater societal good.    
Originality/value:  (i) To introduce both normative discount rates and declining discount rates 
to estimates of shadow environmental provisions within FCA and to contrast these with current 
environmental accounting practices, (ii) To provide two detailed case studies that demonstrate 
the extent to which biodiversity-sensitive investment choices are likely to be undervalued by 
managers who follow current accounting recommendations concerning the appropriate choice 
of discount rate.         
Keywords:  Biodiversity Accounting, Ecosystem Services, Valuation, Declining Discount Rates, 
Gamma Discounting, Normative, Positive. 
Article Classification:  Research Paper.  
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Biodiversity valuation and the discount rate problem  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The objective of Full Cost Accounting (FCA) is to meet the ‘triple bottom line’ of measuring in 
monetary terms the full economic, environmental and social costs of a corporation’s activities 
(e.g., Elkington, 2003).  FCA addresses the fact that the activities of many corporations have 
environmental impacts (for example, air pollution or impacts on habitat and biodiversity) which 
are external to usual accounting procedures and therefore ignored in decision-making.  
Furthermore, environmental costs and benefits typically extend beyond the usual planning time 
horizon for corporations.  For instance, losses of biodiversity arising from, say, deforestation are 
often irreversible.  Hence the costs of biodiversity loss, and particularly extinction, last forever.  
Yet the difficulties do not end there.  Even if environmental costs and benefits are included 
within accounting procedures, and the corporate planning horizons extended over centuries, 
there remains the issue of how to value from today’s perspective the costs of biodiversity loss in 
the far distant future.  Put in terms of cost-benefit analysis, the question is: what discount rate 
should be deployed to evaluate investment decisions with implications which extend into the 
distant future and affect future generations? 
 
In this paper we extend the literature by considering in detail the discount rate that should be 
used to calculate ‘shadow environmental provisions’ of biodiversity-sensitive projects.  These 
reflect the “net present value of the expected external environmental costs as calculated for the 
environmental accounts ... The shadow provision is an indication of how much the company 
knows that it will draw on external human, social and natural capitals to be able to perform its 
value creation in the future” (Richardson and Bent, 2003, pp. 31-32).    
 
The shadow biodiversity provision of an organisation, as might be reflected on an environmental 
balance sheet, will be highly sensitive to the choice of discount rate.  Conservation of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is typified by flows of benefits which persist over time 
horizons of hundreds of years, possibly millennia.  For this reason, the relative importance of 
such benefits in any evaluation of investments in conservation, or equivalently, the costs of 
biodiversity loss associated with alternative investments, is fundamentally determined by the 
weight placed on cash flows in the future.  It is well known that at such horizons the calculated 
present value is highly sensitive to the cost of capital.  For example, the present value of a 
monetised biodiversity benefit in 150 years is 320% higher when calculated at 4% than at 5%.  It 
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is also important that managers are confident of their ground when choosing a discount rate 
because, as noted by Boyce (2000), this is an area that would be open for challenge by any 
given pressure group contesting an ecologically sensitive investment decision. 
 
We make two key contributions.  The first lies within a general FCA framework that is relevant 
beyond accounting for biodiversity alone.  Standard accounting guidelines for long-term 
discounting rely on observable market rates of interest; a practice commonly referred to as 
‘positive’ or ‘descriptive’ discounting.  We argue that these accounting-based recommendations 
will lead socially responsible managers to reject environmental- and ecosystems-sensitive 
projects that are in the greater societal good.  There are two reasons for this.  First, there are 
strong reasons for taking a ‘normative / prescriptive’ approach to long-term decision-making that 
bases the discount rate on ethical considerations of intergenerational justice.  Second, there has 
been increasing recognition that decision-makers should use declining discount rates (DDRs) 
when looking at very long-term cash flows both within positive and normative discounting 
paradigms.  Such declining schedules are now incorporated into Government-body 
recommendations in the US, the UK and France.  Both these effects significantly increase the 
calculated present value of future environmental and biodiversity benefits when compared 
against those that result from the cost of capital recommendations arising from existing 
accounting practice. 
 
Our second contribution is to quantify the potential magnitude of undervaluation of shadow 
biodiversity provisions when managers use market interest rates to inform their long-term 
discount rate.[1]   We undertake two case studies, one local and the other global with both being 
based on the biodiversity benefits of sustainable forestry practice.  The local study that we 
present extends the work of Hepburn and Koundouri (2007) by comparing long- and short-
rotation forestry practices.  The global case study employs the Global Unified Meta-model of the 
Biosphere (GUMBO).  This provides a detailed array of global ecosystem values for forest cover 
and therefore overcomes the failure to evaluate the full range of consequences that has been 
highlighted as a typical problem with economic analyses of biodiversity in the past (TEEB, 
2011).  In addition, since ecosystem values are an integral part of the GUMBO model, changes 
in relative prices associated with ecosystem changes are reflected in the benefit stream 
evaluated.  This overcomes recent criticisms of standard discounting approaches, which 
frequently ignore such issues (Sterner and Persson, 2008). 
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In each case, we discount the monetised benefits of biodiversity-sensitive forestry practices 
using ten different discount rate schedules that have been recommended either in the academic 
literature or by policy makers.  We show that, for the local forestry example, using a fixed 
market interest rate of 4% (all cash flows and discount rates in this paper are given in real 
terms), as might be suggested by current accounting practices, leads to a strong preference for 
short-term pine forestry planting in preference to more biodiversity-friendly broad-leaved 
species, such as oak.  By contrast, a number of alternative cost of capital choices, including 
those recommended by the Stern Review, would lead socially responsible managers to plant 
oak in preference to pine.  In the global example, compared to a fixed 4% discount rate, certain 
schedules increase the present value of ecosystem damages by between 50% and over 1000% 
due to the higher relative weight placed on damages that occur in the distant future. 
 
The central conclusion of our paper is that managers who wish to fulfil their corporate social 
responsibility role should be cautious in using standard accounting recommendations 
concerning the choice of fixed market-based discount rates when calculating shadow 
environmental and biodiversity provisions within an FCA framework.  Instead, we would 
recommend that they carefully consider the literature from environmental economics and the 
recommendations of social policy makers.[2]  A positive, but declining, schedule of discount 
rates, as recommended by Newell and Pizer (2003), and Groom et al. (2007), may best reflect 
the strong arguments for using lower discount rates for intergenerational projects while 
remaining within the accounting tradition of basing costs of capital on observable interest rates.  
If starting at a short-term real rate of 4%, this would result in a recommendation of a real 
discount rate of 3.00% at 50 years, 2.25% at 100 years, 1.50% at 200 years and 1.15% at 300 
years.  As we show in our local example, this would provide a rigorous accounting-based 
justification for planting broad-leaved, biodiversity sensitive, forests in preference to pine.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The following section briefly discusses FCA and other 
environmental accounting practices that are relevant to discounting in the context of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services with particular emphasis on the choice of cost of capital.  Section 3 
then considers the alternative normative framework for intergenerational discounting that is 
preferred by many environmental economists and that generally results in the choice of a 
discount rate than is lower than current market rates.  Section 4 turns to declining discount 
rates, which provides further justification for using low costs of capital at long horizons.  Section 
5 describes the two case studies that we are considering.  In Section 6 we illustrate the 
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sensitivity of ecosystem values to the schedule of discount rates employed.  Section 7 
concludes by summarising the main findings and offering guidance. 
 
2.  Economic accounting for biodiversity 
 
Except under very limited circumstances, current financial accounting standards do not require 
firms to explicitly recognise costs associated with biodiversity degradation that arise from their 
activities.  The most relevant section of the International Accounting Standards is IAS 37 and 
the associated IFRIC 1, which underpin the accounting requirements for calculating the present 
value of future liabilities associated with decommissioning nuclear power sites.  This is clearly a 
closely related area to biodiversity accounting as the cash flows are spread over very long time 
horizons and there are environmental consequences to the operation.  However, this code only 
relates to items “that create a legal or constructive obligation and, therefore, results in an entity 
having no realistic alternative but to settle the obligation’’ [IAS 37.10].  Under the European 
Union Environmental Liabilities Directive (Dir. 2004/35/EC), there is a ‘polluter pays’ principle for 
protected species and habitats (Grabsch et al., 2012), but this is quite limited in terms of the 
actual biodiversity damage that an organisation might inflict.  Grabsch et al. (2012) evidence the 
lack of detailed financial accounting for biodiversity that is undertaken in practice by large 
companies in the UK and Germany. 
 
The emergence of stakeholder and stewardship approaches, as well as the advent of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) has emphasised the importance of the wider social and 
environmental sphere within which business currently operates (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). 
Given the limitations of existing financial standards, Jones (2010) presents a new theoretical 
framework for environmental accounting and reporting in which he argues that it is essential that 
such a framework should recognise such corporate stewardship responsibilities.  This is 
consistent with his earlier observation that “the maintenance of natural inventories is one 
possible way in which they can discharge their social obligations” (Jones, 2003, p.781).  Full 
Cost Accounting, for which Davies (2009), Houdet et al. (2009) and Jones (2010) amongst 
others provide recent comprehensive reviews, lies within this broader stewardship framework.  It 
extends existing financial standards to include monetised values of external costs and benefits 
to the broader environment and society.  Perhaps the best-known implementation of this is the 
Sustainability Assessment Model developed by BP (see, for example, Bebbington and Frame, 
undated).  
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Within an FCA framework, Richardson and Bent (2003) emphasise the need to distinguish 
between stock and flow items.  In this paper, we consider one particular balance sheet item; the 
‘shadow environmental provisions’ of biodiversity-sensitive projects.  This is calculated as the 
present value of the expected net future monetised biodiversity costs or benefits,   , that arise 
from a project with maturity   when a discount rate   is applied:[3]  
 
(1) 
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While, in principle, this is equivalent to accounting for other long-term corporate liabilities on a 
company’s balance sheet, such as pension fund obligations or nuclear decommissioning costs, 
a number of specific difficulties arise in the case of FCA.  Perhaps the most important of these is 
the difficulty in providing estimates of   .  Some, for example, argue that biodiversity and 
environmental assets have an ‘intrinsic’ value beyond that which can be expressed through the 
anthropocentric lens of human utility:  “I suggest that the aggregate value of a chunk of nature 
— its aesthetic beauty, cultural importance and evolutionary significance — is infinite, and thus 
defies incorporation into any ecosystem service programme that aims to save nature by 
approximating its monetary value” (McCauley, 2006, p.27).  Similarly, although global 
ecosystem benefits such as climate regulation, water purification and nutrient recycling have 
been estimated to be worth several multiples of global GDP, even these estimates have been 
described as ‘a significant underestimate of infinity’ (Costanza et al., 1997; Toman 1998).  While 
critiques of this intrinsic approach to environmentalism are also prevalent in the literature (e.g., 
Antheaume, 2007; Justus et al., 2009), many continue to subscribe to this view. 
 
Even for those who do not, the difficulties of how to estimate    are formidable.  First, given the 
complex and dynamic interactions between business and the biosphere it is difficult to know 
‘where to draw the boundaries’ when determining marginal effects.  Even once this is decided, 
methodological choices on whether to use hedonistic or contingent valuation techniques to 
value biodiversity (for example, Meinard and Grill, 2011), and the more detailed specific choice 
of methods, must then be made.  As Bebbington and Frame (undated, p.2) observe “The main 
approaches to monetisation … may yield significantly different measures of externalities”.  Even 
once these hurdles have been crossed, a specific monetary value must still be placed on each 
aspect of biodiversity that is included within the boundaries of analysis, which is a highly 
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challenging and controversial task.  As a consequence, Houdet et al. (2009) point to a lack of 
independent verification mechanisms and consensual approaches so that users of financial 
statements may have a consistent representation of different organisations’ activities within the 
biosphere.   
   
While these, and related, issues concerning the monetisation of costs and benefits of 
biodiversity disruption have been widely discussed within the FCA literature, they are not our 
focus here.  Instead, we concentrate on the other variable that influences shadow biodiversity 
provisions, that is;  .  While Richardson and Bent (2003, p.32) state that “choosing an 
appropriate discount rate would be a challenge”, to our knowledge, there has been little 
previous detailed consideration of this point.  This contrasts with the extensive literature within 
environmental economics on long-term social discount rates, which we will review in the next 
two sections.   
 
In the absence of any specific recommendations for the choice of   within the FCA literature and 
given the clear similarities between general intergenerational environmental issues and nuclear 
decommissioning, a strong argument could be made that accounting standard IAS 37 / IFRIC 1 
is the one most suited for the purpose of valuing the costs and benefits that arise from 
biodiversity initiatives.  Provisions would then be based on “the amount that an entity would 
rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party” 
[IAS 37.36] at “the current market-based discount rate’’ [IFRIC 1]. 
 
This is largely in line with US GAAP policy on nuclear decommissioning.  As Taylor (2008, p.18) 
notes “the accounting treatment of nuclear liabilities has converged somewhat over the last 
decade between US, UK and International principles. Decommissioning liabilities must be 
recognised in full at their present value, using an appropriate market based discount rate".  In 
terms of what the market interest rate should be, Taylor (2008) argues that the decision should 
be consistent with that used for discounting the liabilities of defined benefit pension plans.  
Under IAS 19, “the rate used to discount estimated cash flows should be determined by 
reference to market yields at the balance sheet date on high quality corporate bonds’’ [IAS 
19.78] which is generally interpreted to refer to those that are AA-rated. [4] 
 
The theoretical justification for this positivist approach is well-known: “Any action that would 
divert some of this productive capital to finance a safe investment project whose return is 
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smaller than the interest rate would destroy wealth.  If asked, future generations would reject 
this action.  This arbitrage argument provides a strong argument for using the interest rate as 
the rate to discount risk free investment projects” (Gollier, 2012, p.3).  Despite this, Beckerman 
and Hepburn (2007) remind us of Amartya Sen’s (1982) reservations about market interest 
rates. Future generations are absent from current markets which only reflect the preferences of 
the present generation, who may not consider future generations at all.  In this sense financial 
markets fail and discounting using market rates will lead to inefficient investment decisions, to 
which future generations would object if they could.  Sen (1982) argues that current generations 
and their governments have a ‘super-responsibility’ to reflect these preferences. These 
unavoidable ethical considerations tie in directly with the issue of sustainable economic 
development, which has also been the focus of recent developments in corporate finance and 
corporate governance (e.g., Guthrie and Parker, 2011).  Sen (1982) also argues that individuals 
act with different ‘hats’ on: we behave in different ways depending on the context and play 
different roles in the marketplace compared to when considering ethical or political questions.  
Members of the current generation may be more concerned about future generations when 
wearing their ‘political hat’ than is reflected in their decisions in the marketplace with their 
‘consumer hat’ on.  The former is more appropriate for questions of intergenerational equity.  
Beyond this, Beckerman and Hepburn (2007) argue that, even if markets were perfect, the 
aggregation of individual preferences embodied in market prices may not be appropriate for 
intergenerational decision-making.  For instance, market prices reflect the current distribution of 
income, and people with higher incomes have disproportionate influence in the market place.  
For this reason, many believe that market prices may not necessarily form a sound basis for the 
essentially ethical decisions associated with intergenerational projects.  In short, there are 
numerous reasons why, despite reflecting how current generations actually do trade-off costs 
and benefits over time, it may be a mistake for a socially responsible manager to use this 
observed rate for intergenerational analysis. 
 
Because of these concerns, many economists prefer to use normative techniques when 
calculating present values of future environmental damage.  The normative school asks the 
question ‘how ought we to discount the future?’, as opposed to the positive school that asks the 
question ‘how do we discount the future?’.  When considering intergenerational projects the 
distinction between these two approaches can be extremely important and, as we show in 
Sections 5 and 6, leads to large differences in valuation for biodiversity-sensitive projects at 
both the local and global levels.  Our central argument is that, because FCA takes a 
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stewardship view of the organisation, there are strong arguments for managers to favour either 
the ethical considerations contained within normative economics or a positivist approach that 
allows for declining discount rates.  As we show below, both these approaches are likely to 
increase the estimated present value of future biodiversity costs and make it less likely that 
socially responsible managers will reject biodiversity-sensitive projects that are in the greater 
societal good.   
 
3.  Normative approaches to discounting 
 
The economic accounting of biodiversity and environmental projects currently has very high 
policy relevance.  In October 2011, the World Bank announced the launch of the Global 
Partnership for Ecosystems and Ecosystem Services Valuation and Wealth Accounting, stating 
that "the goal is to introduce the practice of ecosystem valuation into national accounts at scale 
so that better management of natural environments becomes ‘business as usual'" (World Bank 
Press Release No:2011/155/SDN).  This partnership is explicitly built upon on the final report of 
the United Nations Environment Programme "The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity" 
(TEEB, 2011), and Chapter 6 of its "Ecological and Economic Foundations" section perhaps 
constitutes the most up-to-date discussion of social discounting as it relates to biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. 
 
Relatedly, the System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) is "the statistical 
framework that provides internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications, accounting 
rules and standard tables for producing internationally comparable statistics on the environment 
and its relationship with the economy. The SEEA framework follows a similar accounting 
structure as the System of National Accounts (SNA) and uses concepts, definitions and 
classifications consistent with the SNA in order to facilitate the integration of environmental and 
economic statistics".[5]  At the time of writing this is currently under revision (SEEA, 2011) but 
Annex A5.2 of the current draft version considers in detail the appropriate choice of social 
discount rate for use within such a framework. 
 
Within this branch of economics, the objective of evaluating projects is to establish whether they 
contribute to social welfare measured in terms of utility.  This is usually thought of as being a 
concave function of consumption of a single consumption good tc ,  tu c .  Social welfare, W, 
aggregates utility over time by taking its present value: 
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Parameter     is the ‘utility discount rate’ or ‘pure rate of time preference’ and measures how 
the price of utility evolves over time.  
 
The economic approach to discounting described here is firmly rooted in the Utilitarian tradition 
which is consequentialist in nature.  The 'goodness' in any action or policy is thereby measured 
in terms of the final outcomes.  There is no stock placed in the process by which outcomes are 
arrived at and procedural ethics are ignored.  It is, therefore, not without its problems.  As 
colourfully articulated by Beckerman and Hepburn (2007), the throwing of Christians to the lions 
in ancient Rome may well have resulted in a positive appraisal under this type of cost-benefit 
analysis.  Such anomalies have steered many towards alternative ethical frameworks which 
emphasise procedures and elements of duty that have been applied to other questions of moral 
ethics.  Deontological approaches recognise that future generations have rights; for example, 
the right to a stable climate or biodiverse ecosystems. Others emphasise the present 
generation's duty towards future generations to not impinge upon their well-being, a perspective 
not completely removed from the idea of sustainable development.  In defense of 
consequentialism, and the part it has to play in decision making, Dasgupta (2007) reminds us 
that it would be unwise to adhere doggedly to some particular procedural ethical stance without 
at the same time knowing the consequences of this position.  Ultimately such tricky decisions 
must reflect what Rawls described as a 'reflective equilibrium', considering both the 
deontological and the consequentialist approaches to social ethics (Dasgupta, 2007).  
 
Within the utility discounting approach captured in equation (2), future environmental and 
biodiversity costs and benefits are expressed in terms of changes in the consumption pattern, 
measured in monetary terms, over time.  This is consistent with the monetisation of externalities 
within an FCA framework.  Again, the focus of this paper is not in addressing the ethical, 
methodological or practical difficulties associated with this task.  Instead we turn to the three 
other central elements that determine  .  The first is the degree of concavity of the utility 
function, which reflects the fact that an extra unit of benefit contributes less to utility when 
consumption is high than when it is low.  The more curved the utility function, the stronger the 
incentive to smooth consumption.  In a standard ‘power’ utility function the curvature is reflected 
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through the parameter η.  Second, the growth rate in consumption,  , is of relevance.  Since the 
curvature of the utility function reflects a desire to transfer wealth from periods of high 
consumption to those of low consumption, the more we expect the economy to grow, the less 
we will be willing to defer benefits into the future.  Therefore, if we expect the world to get richer 
     , increases in both η and   will reduce the amount we will be willing to sacrifice today for 
benefits gained by subsequent generations.  Finally, the parameter ρ reflects the social 
‘impatience’ of waiting for future utility gains.  Again, increases in ρ lead to a greater preference 
for current over future benefits.    
 
In a growing economy, this framework implies that consumption at future time t has a lower 
price associated with it than consumption today.  Given the discount rate measures the rate of 
decline of this price, it must reflect these three elements.  It is easy to show, and is extremely 
heavily documented in the economics literature, that when the objective is to maximise W, the 
discount rate, or social rate of time preference (SRTP), δ, is given by: 
 
(3) g     
 
The economists’ rationale for discounting future consumption within this normative framework is 
conceptually different from that of the positivist school of environmental accounting and, as we 
will discuss below, has been extremely influential in determining discounting policy in most 
OECD countries.  However, the SRTP is not necessarily completely divorced from the standard 
environmental accounting approach.  When all markets are competitive and devoid of frictions 
and distortions then δ can be replaced by   in equation (3), which then becomes known as the 
Ramsey equation.  Any project that increases the NPV of private profit will also increase social 
profit, hence it does not matter which framework is used to determine the discount rate to 
employ for socially valuable projects.  When the markets are distorted by taxes on profit or 
consumption (e.g., income tax), this relationship breaks down.  Various corrections exist in this 
case reflecting whether the project displaces consumption, private investment or a combination 
of the two (Lind, 1982).  
 
Despite the powerful arguments in favour of the normative approach, economists remain split on 
intergenerational discounting (Arrow et al., 1996).  Where streams of consumption are to be 
evaluated, the positive school will calibrate the parameters of the SRTP in order to be 
descriptive of market interest rates as we see them today.  It is fair to say that the environmental 
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accountant’s approach to discounting is firmly rooted within this approach that implicitly views 
private profitability as being equal to social profitability.  The normative school, by contrast, 
takes a prescriptive approach to the selection of the pure rate of time preference,  , and the 
curvature of the utility function,  , for use within equation (3).    
 
The parameter ρ represents the rate at which the weight placed on future generations’ well-
being by the present generation declines with the time horizon which, at the level of the 
individual, is akin to impatience.  At the level of the planner, the parameter reflects an ethical 
judgement about the value of future well-being today which lies at the heart of CSR.  With 
      distant future generations’ well-being counts for next-to-nothing in present value terms, 
no matter the magnitude of the cash flow being evaluated.  While this phenomenon is true of 
discounting in general, a long tradition of Utilitarian economists argue that when applied to well-
being/utility all generations should be treated equally.  Luminaries of economics, including 
Ramsey, Pigou, Harrod, and Solow, have made this point forcefully.  For instance, Ramsey 
famously described positive discounting of utility as ‘ethically indefensible’.  Harrod described it 
as “the conquest of reason by passion”.  For these reasons the Stern Review on the economics 
of climate change also took this view when evaluating climate change investments (Stern, 
2007). 
 
Of course, these are simply statements of belief rather than fact, and other prominent 
economists have taken a different stance.  For instance, Kenneth Arrow has argued from the 
basis of ‘agent relative ethics’ that positive discounting of future utilities is perfectly ethical 
(Arrow, 1999). After all, it seems unlikely that we are ethically obliged to weigh future 
generations’ well-being in a million years time in the same way as our own well-being today.  So 
there are several potentially equally valid beliefs on the issue, and no clear recipe for agreement 
(Beckerman and Hepburn, 2007).  There are ethically dubious outcomes whatever one decides 
about pure time preference.  On the one hand, it has been shown that the incomes of future 
generations will be driven to almost zero by an optimising Utilitarian planner that is dependent 
on non-renewable resources.  On the other hand, in a similar context, zero pure time preference 
can prescribe crippling levels of saving and investment for the current generation.  So, careful 
thought is required on this issue for fear of ‘tyrannising’ the present or future generations 
(Dasgupta, 2005; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). 
 
The parameter   has also been the source of ethical discussion.  This parameter measures the 
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curvature of the utility function and reflects the desire to smooth income from periods of high to 
low consumption.  As a consequence, it captures at least three different economic effects.  First, 
it reflects individuals’ motives for smoothing consumption across time.  This lies behind such 
fundamental economic concepts as the Permanent Income Hypothesis.  Second, it captures 
any individual’s desire to ensure that their consumption is not too volatile at any given point in 
time: a characteristic commonly known as risk aversion.  Finally, it presents a social motive for 
re-distributing wealth from the richest to the poorest and to reduce social inequality.  Within the 
normative approach to social discounting it is the first of these interpretations, the concern about 
the distribution of well-being and consumption over time, that is of primary concern and drives 
the choice of η.   
 
3.1. Influence on policy 
 
The aftermath of the Stern Review offers a salutary tale in regard to the sensitivity of 
intergenerational investment decisions to whether a positive or normative approach is taken to 
discounting.  Stern took the normative view that all future well-beings should be given the same 
weight as the present.  In the end Stern chose 0.1%   to reflect the risk of societal collapse; 
after all, it seems reasonable to place less weight on future societies if we believe that they may 
not exist due to some catastrophe or other.  He then selected 1 and a central case growth 
estimate       , making the SRTP 1.41%.  Nordhaus (2007), on the other hand took a 
positive approach to discounting and calibrated the parameters of the SRTP so that they 
matched the observed average real return to equities of around 5-6%.  On the basis of studies 
of observed consumption smoothing, he chose 2  .  With growth at 1.5%, the implicit value of 
2 3%   . Now each approach leads to radically different policy recommendations for climate 
change.  One measure of how each party weighs future benefits and costs differently can be 
found in estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC), which is the present value of carbon 
damages from a ton of carbon emitted today (£/tC).  The Stern Review estimated this at around 
£300/tC, while for Nordhaus the estimate was £13/tC with the difference arising purely from the 
choice of descriptive against prescriptive discounting.  As Nordhaus (2007, p.686) notes “The 
Review’s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not 
survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today’s marketplace real interest 
rates and savings rates”.  As a consequence, the sensitivity of optimal environmental policy 
decisions to the stance taken on discounting has been at the forefront of the economic debate 
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that has followed from Stern (2007); see, for example, Weitzman (2007a) and Stern (2008). 
 
The ethical approach that Stern (2007) took has also had clear impacts on other areas of 
economic accounting.  HM Treasury (2006, Annex 6) parameterises the Ramsey equation on 
similar lines and, in supplementary guidance (Lowe, 2008), directly contrasts its 
recommendations against those of Stern (2007).  TEEB (2011, Chapter 6) concludes that a 
normative ethical stance is probably the most suitable in relation to biodiversity and that setting 
0=  is appropriate.  
 
Against this, both SEEA and the US Environmental Protection Agency are leaning towards the 
positive school.  SEEA (2011, pp.282-3) states “Consequently the relevant rate should be 
descriptive … because judgements are required regarding societal preferences, it is not 
recommended that prescriptive approaches to the determination of discount rates be used for 
the purposes of official statistics’’.  Similarly the USEPA (2010, p.6-23) states that “Calculate the 
NPV using the consumption rate of interest …As of the date of this publication, current 
estimates of the consumption rate of interest, based on recent returns to Government-backed 
securities, are close to 3%’’.   
 
This debate around the Stern Review highlights an issue that will be central to our discussions 
below.  “It seems generally to be the case that those rates determined on a more prescriptive 
basis are lower than rates determined on a descriptive basis but this is not always the case’’ 
(SEEA, 2011, p.281).  This means that environmental accountants, should they base their 
valuations on IAS 19 and IAS 37, are likely to derive lower present values for biodiversity 
conservation initiatives compared to environmental economists purely from the stance that they 
take on discounting.  As we will see in the next section, there is a second effect that amplifies 
this result. 
 
4.  Declining discount rates 
 
Environmental economists have a second rationale for discounting long-term cash flows at a 
low cost of capital.  This is based on the theoretical and empirical literature that asserts that the 
discount rate should decline with the time horizon.  In subsection 4.3 we emphasise the 
importance that this literature has had on economic policy, but the lack of impact it has made in 
the field of environmental accounting.  First, though, we justify the use of declining schedules of 
discount rates, where perhaps the most famous motivation can be found in the work of 
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Weitzman (1998).  His argument began with the uncontentious statement that the average rate 
of interest, a contender for the social discount rate, is extremely uncertain in the long run. In 
particular, being determined by technological change, resource constraints, population growth 
and other economic fundamentals, it is unlikely that average future interest rates will revert to 
what they were in the past. This long-run uncertainty underpins a declining discount rate. A 
simple example describes how. 
 
Imagine a planner who must make a decision about a project which pays off £ tB  at time  , but 
who is unsure about what is the ‘correct’ discount rate with which to discount the future.  
Suppose that the planner believes there are two possible and equally likely scenarios. In 
scenario 1 the (continuously compounded) discount rate is 1% and in scenario 2 the discount 
rate is  5%: 1 1%r   and 2 5%r  . Once uncertainty is resolved the discount rate remains 
constant forever. In scenario 1 the present value of tB  would be     
       . In scenario 2 the 
present value would be     
      .  
 
Weitzman’s essential insight was that when the discount rate is uncertain, it is appropriate for 
the planner to evaluate the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) of the project rather than 
calculating the net present value using the expected discount rate of 3%. The ENPV in this 
example is calculated as follows: 
 
(4)    [ 
    ]  
 
 
  [ 
              ]  
 
This amounts to calculating the expected discount factor rather than using the expected 
discount rate. Yet estimating the expected discount factor is equivalent to discounting using the 
certainty equivalent discount rate, 
CE
tr , 
which is defined as the certain rate that would give the 
same ENPV:    
   
       [ 
    ].  Weitzman (1998) showed that CEtr  declines from its mean 
(in this case 3%) at t = 0 to the lowest possible value of the discount rate as the time horizon 
extends to infinity (in this case 1%). Table 1 provides a numerical illustration. Column 1 shows 
the two possible future scenarios: 1% or 5%. Rows 2 and 3 show the discount factor that would 
be associated with each scenario for time horizons of 1, 25, 100, 200 and 400 years.  Row 4 
presents the average discount factor across the two scenarios assuming they are equally likely 
to happen.  Row 5 calculates the certainty equivalent discount rate for each time horizon. This 
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illustrates the decline in CE
tr  towards the lowest possible value of the discount rate of 1%.  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
This  occurs because "from today's perspective, the only relevant limiting scenario is the one 
with the lowest interest rate, all of the other states at that far distant time, by comparison, are 
relatively much less important now because their present value has been reduced by the power 
of compound discounting at a higher rate" (Weitzman, 1998, p 205).  
 
The numerical example is extremely simple but captures the essence of the argument.  
Naturally the result generalises to accommodate many possible future realisations of the 
discount rate and to different conceptions of uncertainty.[6]  The question then is how to 
operationalise the theory and characterise the future possible states and the probabilities that 
they will be realised.  
 
4.1.  Declining discount rates in the normative framework  
 
To parameterise this model Weitzman (2001) undertook a survey in which he asked over 2000 
PhD economists, and a smaller ‘blue ribbon’ subsample of 50 which included a handful of Nobel 
prize winners, for their preferred ‘rate of interest' for discounting climate change damages.  He 
then showed that the appropriate certainty-equivalent discount rate that resulted from the survey 
has a convenient closed form solution.  The resulting value of 
CE
tr  depends on the sample 
mean and variance of the reponses and the time horizon considered.  Specifically, he showed 
that the decline of 
CE
tr  with the time horizon is much quicker the greater the variance of the 
survey responses.  This can be thought of as a measure of disagreement; the more expert 
opinion conflicts, the more rapid the decline in the term structure.  The experts that Weitzman 
consulted gave a wide range of answers, ranging from -3% to +27%, and this led to a sharply 
declining schedule of discount rates; see Figure 1.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
More recently, Jouini et al. (2010) disentangled the uncertainty in the different responses to 
Weitzman’s survey into the components of the SRTP:  ,   and g.  They showed that if experts 
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have varying beliefs about   and g, then the appropriate certainty equivalent discount rate 
declines similarly but from a higher starting point.  Jouini and Napp (2010) then parameterise 
their approach using Weitzman’s data and the resulting schedule can be seen in Figure 1 (J&N).  
By comparison, Weitzman’s schedule falls to 2% after 200 years, whereas J&N’s schedule falls 
to 2.3%, having started from around 5%. 
 
4.2.  Declining discount rates in the positivist framework  
 
The use of declining discount rates is not restricted only to those who take a normative stance 
to intergenerational discounting.  Most notably, Newell and Pizer (2003) econometrically model 
the very long-term history of Government bond returns.  Based on this stochastic process, they 
are able to determine a term structure of discount rates.  Adjustments have subsequently been 
made to this schedule, either by changing the econometric approach (Groom et al., 2007) or the 
choice of data (Gollier et al., 2008).   
 
This approach again leads to a sharply declining term structure.  For example, under the Newell 
and Pizer (2003) parameterisation, the discount rate falls from a short-rate of 4% to 1.1% after 
200 years.  For Groom et al. (2007) the fall is from 4% to 1.8%.  Therefore, although these 
papers are derived in a very different paradigm from those of Weitzman (2001) and Jouini and 
Napp (2010), the implications for valuation are similar.   
 
Freeman and Groom (2012) take an entirely different approach to calculating declining discount 
rates in a descriptive environment.  They argue that many respondents to Weitzman’s 2001 
survey might reasonably have interpreted the question in a purely positive way.  In this case, the 
question would be most naturally interpreted as asking for a forecast of average future real 
interest rates over a long horizon. Each response, ir ,
 can then be modelled as the ‘true’ 
discount rate, tr ,
 and a forecast error, ie ,
 with variance 
2
e .  If the planner believes that each 
expert is unbiased in his or her forecast, and experts are independent, then by the central limit 
theorem, the probability distribution that the planner can derive for the ‘true’ discount rate is 
 nrNr eit /,~ 2 , where n  is the number of respondents and   ̅ is the average taken across the 
different responses.  Because Weitzman ran such a large survey, this effectively removes all 
uncertainty in tr  and therefore the uncertainty that drives the declining schedule virtually 
disappears.  As a consequence, and in notable contrast to Weitzman (2001), the resultant term 
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structure is effectively flat.   
 
Of course the assumption of over 2000 totally independent academic opinions is not realistic, 
and therefore Freeman and Groom (2012) extend their argument to the case of correlated 
forecast errors.  When correlation between expert opinions is high, Freeman and Groom (2012) 
find that the term structure of discount rates does decline, but still more slowly than the 
schedules derived in other studies.  For example, in their exponentially correlated case with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.99, which corresponds to the same information content as 
approximately 10 independent experts, the discount rate declines from 4.37% at year one to 
3.60% at 200 years. 
 
In addition to the normative and positivist approaches based on the expected net present value 
condition, there are other justifications for declining schedules of discount rates which, for 
reasons of conciseness, we do not include in this paper; see, for example, Weitzman (2007b) 
and Gollier (2008).  The principle of discounting long-term cash flows at a lower rate of return 
than their short-term equivalent counterparts is therefore widely accepted by environmental 
economists.   
 
4.3. The impact of declining discount rates on policy 
 
This declining discount rate literature has had an important impact on economic policy.  For 
example, HM Treasury (2006) recommends a short term discount rate of 3.5%, falling to 2.6% 
at 200 years.  French government policy is for the discount rate to decline from 4% in the short-
term to 2.3% after 200 years (Lebègue, 2005).  In addition, SEEA and the USEPA, both of 
whom can be broadly categorised in the positivist camp, and therefore closest to environmental 
accountants in their beliefs about how costs of capital should be estimated, explicitly recognise 
the problems of using market interest rates in the long-term.  For example:   
 
“A general concern on the use of market based discount rates is that they tend to be 
relatively higher rates which in turn tend to provide relatively low values in absolute 
terms beyond normal planning timeframes, say 30 years. Thus for long lived and 
potentially everlasting resources, the use of relatively lower rates will tend to 
recognise values for these resources into the future to a greater extent. Independent 
of any implied societal preferences, lower discount rates may therefore better reflect 
the likely values of these resources. Also, especially for environmental resources, 
the recognition of values over a longer time period may assist in understanding the 
problem that while the benefits received from the environment tend to be received 
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immediately, the costs to the environment may only be evidenced much later. The 
use of declining discount rates may be a way to deal with these issues.”  (SEEA, 
2011, p.282) 
 
Despite this widespread recognition of the advantages of using low discount rates in the long 
term, to our knowledge there has been no consideration of such matters within FCA.  As a 
consequence, environmental accountants are likely to estimate lower present values than 
environmental economists on biodiversity liabilities.  This may again lead managers to reject 
environmentally friendly projects that are in the greater societal good.  
 
In our local and global forestry case studies in Section 5, we evaluate the long-term values of 
biodiversity using ten different term structures of discount rates.  The first is at a flat discount 
rate of 4%.  We choose this value for a number of reasons.  Most importantly, it is the short-term 
rate given in both Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et al. (2007), which take a market interest 
rate based approach.  In addition, the French government uses a short-term rate of 4%, with the 
UK Treasury recommending a slightly lower value of 3.5%.  Finally, 4% is the average response 
of Weitzman’s 2001 survey data. 
 
The next three schedules are based on policy recommendations.  We use HM Treasury (2006) 
Green Book guidance and that of the French government.  For the UK, the rationale for the 
recommended schedule of DDRs is not specific to the normative or positive schools in the 
sense that the motivating literature references Newell and Pizer (2003) as well as Weitzman 
(1998, 2001).  In the case of the French government, the approach can be thought of as 
normative and stemming from the model of parameter uncertainty discussed in Gollier (2008).  
Both schedules decline at slower rates than many academic schedules propose.  We also use a 
flat rate of 1.4%, which is close to the rate employed in the Stern Review.  We then present two 
academic schedules based within a normative paradigm, Weitzman (2001) and Jouini and Napp 
(2010), before turning to four positivist term structures with declining schedules; Newell and 
Pizer (2003), Groom et al. (2007) and two from Freeman and Groom (2012) which correspond 
to low and high correlation between expert forecasts (“Many experts” and “Few experts”, which 
have exponential correlation coefficients of 0.5 and 0.99 respectively).  In Figure 1, we present 
eight of these term structures; Stern (2007) and Freeman and Groom (2012, “Many experts”) 
are excluded as these are both either perfectly, or very nearly, flat.   
 
5.  Forest biodiversity and ecosystem services  
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In this section we present two examples of the differences between normative and positive and 
declining and non-declining discount rates for the evaluation of biodiversity- and ecosystem-
sensitive projects.  Both examples come from forestry.  The first is a local example of a forest 
enterprise in the UK considering whether to operate on long rotations of 120 years or on short 
rotations of 22 years.  The species and management systems of long rotation forests also 
provides biodiversity values and ecosystem services for which monetary values have been 
estimated in the UK.  The trade-off is typical of the kind of issue faced by a company; short-term 
gain versus long-term private losses, with biodiversity and ecosystem services provided as a 
public good and hence external to the narrow aim of maximising shareholder wealth. 
 
The second example is a global example of the impact over 300 years of marginal changes in 
global forest cover.  This example deploys the GUMBO model which was designed with the 
express intention of providing detailed estimates of the values of global ecosystem services. 
 
5.1. Forestry and biodiversity: Long versus short rotations 
 
Two possible management systems for forestry are compared.  The short rotation is of 22 years 
and relates to the planting of pine.  The long rotation model is of 120 years and reflects the 
cultivation of broad-leaved species such as oak.  The cash flows associated with each rotation 
period are taken from Hepburn and Koundouri (2007) who in turn developed their example in 
consultation with the Forestry Commission.  We extend this analysis by incorporating 
biodiversity values into the long rotation model and then comparing the present values of this 
approach to the case where the short rotation model is undertaken repeatedly.   
 
The non-monetary biodiversity value of broad-leaved forests has been estimated using a variety 
of economic methdologies which use hypothetical or surrogate markets to impute values for the 
environment where no direct market exists. Stated preference methods, such as Contingent 
Valuation (CVM) or Choice Experiments (CE), elicit values for biodiversity from individuals by 
presenting hypothetical market scenarios in which monetary trade-offs are considered.  With 
CVM, individuals are asked for their willingness to pay (WTP) for marginal changes in the level 
of biodiversity conservation, such as the number of species or area of habitat conserved.  CE 
methods typically present more detailed policy.  For example, respondents may be asked to 
choose between two policies which differ in attributes such as the number of species conserved, 
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the site at which the species are conserved, the cost of the conservation policy and the mode of 
implementation.  Both CVM and CE elicit monetary estimates of the marginal value of 
biodiversity. 
 
On occasion, surrogate markets, such as housing or transport, can be used to indirectly 
estimate the value of non-marketed environmental goods.  Typical examples include the Travel 
Cost and Hedonic Valuation methods.  The former derives values for environmental goods from 
the costs of travel to sites for eco-tourism.  The Hedonic method uses variation in house prices, 
for instance, to establish the marginal value of environmental amenities such as the proximity to 
parks and forests.  
 
Experience with stated and revealed preference methods for valuing environmental goods is 
long and detailed and the methods themselves have improved considerably in their acceptability 
and robustness over the past few decades.  Biodiversity valuation in the context of forests has 
frequently been the focus for these methods.  For instance,  Hanley et al. (2002) undertook a 
study to estimate the willingness to pay for the increase in biodiversity arising from a 
restructuring of remote forest activities away from single species (pine) towards native broad-
leaved varieties.  Using CVM they found that such structural changes were worth between 61 
and 84 pence per household per year.  This contrasts with estimates by Garrod and Willis 
(1997), who also used CVM, of 35 pence per year per household for structural changes which 
emphasised the generation of shelterbelts rather than recreating native forests, and 100 pence 
per household per year for the preservation of ancient native forests.   
 
Our case study analyses the present value of short versus long rotation forestry on a single 
forest plot.  For the purposes of this study, we follow the more up-to-date study by Willis et al. 
(2003) and assume that the additional biodiversity value of the change from short-rotation to 
long-rotation is worth approximately 50p per household per year.  These values were elicited 
using a stated preference CVM approach.  Given this value was estimated in relation to the 
96000ha of the native broad-leaved forest in the UK, and assuming that the value is 
representative of 25m households in the UK, this gives us an approximate estimated figure for 
biodiversity values of £120 per hectare per year for long-rotation forests over and above the 
short-rotation.  Table 2 shows the cash flows assumed for each forest rotation model. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
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5.2. Global Unified Meta-model of the Biosphere (GUMBO): A simulation of global forest 
ecosystem values 
 
We next consider a global example of the impact of discounting choices on estimating 
ecosystem values.  The GUMBO model that forms the foundation for this case study was 
designed with the express purpose of providing a comprehensive valuation of global ecosystem 
services (Boumans et al., 2002).  We undertake a simulation on the GUMBO model which 
produces a schedule of marginal damages over a 300 year horizon from a marginal change in 
global forest cover.    
 
GUMBO was developed in order to provide simulations of the interactions between economics 
and ecology by modelling them as an integrated dynamic system.  Importantly, GUMBO was the 
first to model the complex and dynamic feedbacks between technology, production, welfare, 
and ecosystem goods and services.  Different ‘modules' model carbon, water and nutrient fluxes 
within 11 different ecosystems and five different ’spheres’: the atmosphere (including 
atmospheric carbon and global temperature), lithosphere (soil, rocks etc.), hydrosphere (water, 
carbon and genetic nutrients in water bodies), biosphere (e.g., photosynthesis, respiration, 
nitrogen fixing) and lastly, economic and social consequences are modelled in an 
‘anthroposphere'.  In the last, population change, well-being and production are modelled and 
can be influenced by different policy regimes and assumptions about the future concerning 
technological change, quantity of oil and other reserves, and so on.  The parameters of the 
model have been calibrated to reproduce historical data on ecosystems, such as land coverage 
and composition of the atmosphere.  The model is a synthesis of several existing dynamic 
global models.  It contains 234 state variables, 930 variables in total and 1715 parameters.[7]   
 
Importantly, GUMBO contains specific assumptions concerning sustainability and 
substitutability.  The model embodies the principle of ’strong sustainability' which limits the 
substitutability of natural and physical capital and limits the extent to which economic growth 
can continue as critical natural resources and ecosystem services are depleted.  GUMBO also 
contains several scenarios which vary the stringency of some of these assumptions and the 
policies implemented.  In short GUMBO provides a perspective on the role of ecosystem 
services in generating long-run well-being which embodies some of the complex constraints 
such as irreversibility, non-linearity and threshold effects that typify ecosystems (Boumans et al., 
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2002). 
 
The GUMBO model was originally used to estimate the total value of ecosystem services within 
the earth system.  For the purposes of our investigation into the impact of the choice of discount 
rate we undertake an alternate experiment.  The theories of discounting we have discussed are 
only strictly valid in the context of marginal changes in consumption which leave growth 
relatively unaffected.  The robustness of the theory to non-marginal changes has been 
investigated by Dietz and Hepburn (2010) and Gollier (2008).  The implications are that even 
with perturbations of the magnitude envisaged by the Stern Review (5% of GDP), the marginal 
analysis provides a largely accurate approximation.  The definition of non-marginal changes 
appears to be in the order of 10% of GDP.  Therefore, rather than focussing on total ecosystem 
values we simulate instead an incremental change.  This also reflects the fact that, in most 
policy contexts, it is the marginal values that are of interest, while this approach circumvents 
some, though by no means all, of the criticisms levelled at the Costanza et al. (1997) study. 
 
We simulate the ‘marginal' loss in ecosystem service values arising from a once and for all 
0.01% increase in the rate of global deforestation.  Several important aspects of forest 
ecosystem values are valued by the GUMBO model relating to seven different ecosystem 
services: climate regulation, gas regulation, waste assimilation, soil maintenance, 
disturbance/resilience, nutrient function and cultural values.  Climate regulation chiefly concerns 
temperature and precipitation.  Gas regulation concerns the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere, waste assimilation refers to the recovery and breaking down of nutrients.  Soil 
maintenance concerns the processes that form soils, and nutrient function refers to the 
acquisition of nutrients in the global system, such as plant uptake of nitrogen.  Cultural values 
refer to recreational activities such as eco-tourism and sport fishing as well as other activities 
like worship and aesthetic appreciation.  
 
The simulation is run for 300 years and two scenarios are chosen for comparative purposes.  
These scenarios contain different assumptions about the way the future pans out with regard to, 
amongst other things, technological change and the response of ecosystems to expansion in 
the anthroposphere. The two scenarios that we use are pre-structured examples within the 
GUMBO model that we apply without alteration, and are illustratively referred to as the ’Mad 
Max' and the ‘Big Government’ scenarios. 
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The Mad Max scenario is so called for its potentially apocalyptic outcomes, in the view of 
Boumens et al. (2002).  It assumes ‘technologically optimistic' policies are pursued involving 
high consumption and investment in built capital and a future in which very little technological 
change takes place and hence the beliefs driving the policies turn out to be false.  The idea 
behind this policy is that it results in bad outcomes in the future for technological optimists in 
terms of resource conversion and depletion, and hence loss of ecosystem services. 
 
The Big Government scenario assumes the opposite: ‘technological skepticism' which fosters 
lower consumption and a shift in investment towards human and social capital.  The skepticism 
turns out to be misplaced and technological change exceeds expectations.  The difference 
between the state in which technology and environmental outcomes turn out to be poor and the 
state in which they turn out to be good are reflected in Table 3.  In the Big Government scenario 
the effect of the application of energy on agricultural harvests and yields is higher, with 
parameters of 0.3 and 0.04 respectively compared to 0.2 and 0.02 in the Mad Max scenario.  
The policy parameters are much more prudent in the Big Government scenario compared to the 
Mad Max scenario. Investment is spread more equally across the three types of capital on offer 
(human, natural and physical) with rates of investment of 18%, 30% and 10% respectively 
compared to 5%, 0% and 20% in the Mad Max scenario.  The latter shows a huge reliance on 
physical (man-made) capital compared to natural and human capital, a strategy widely seen as 
unsustainable by environmental and ecological economists alike.  Ultimately, the Mad Max 
scenario reflects a world in which poor policy meets unkind environmental resources and 
resilience, which leads to lower well-being in the long-run.  
  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
These deterministic and exogenous differences in assumptions drive radical differences in the 
estimates of loss of ecosystem service.  Feedback effects ensure that these differences arise 
for complicated reasons.  Figure 2 shows the marginal schedule of deforestation, in millions of 
hectares (mHa) per annum, from each of these scenarios.  As its name implies, the Mad Max 
scenario leads to a significantly worse total loss in global forestry; approximately 100 mHa 
against 40 mHa, representing a loss of 1% and 0.8% of global forest cover respectively.  The 50 
year average rates of deforestation in the base case of each scenario are 11 and 12mHa 
respectively.  By way of comparison, in 2010 global deforestation was estimated at 13mHa 
(FAO, 2010). 
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[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the total loss of ecosystem services in the Mad Max and Big Government 
scenarios expressed in terms of trillions of dollars.  We have used a polynomial filter to smooth 
these numbers for presentation purposes but use the raw estimates when calculating present 
values below.  It is easy to see that the losses gradually increase over time for approximately 
the first 100 years and oscillate somewhat thereafter.  The gradual changes reflect inertia in 
climate regulatory systems, waste assimilation and nutrient cycles, and the oscillation reflects 
differences in the evolution of ecosystem values in each scenario.  The GUMBO model is 
integrated and so deforestation has impacts on a wide variety of factors in the anthroposphere, 
such as population growth, via changes in ecosystem services.  The total losses are composed 
of losses in the full range of ecosystem services provided by forests.   
 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
 
In the Big Government scenario, the skeptical policies combined with better than expected 
technological and ecological outcomes lead to a large attenuation of the ecosystem values after 
100 or so years, before returning to a higher level.  The effect in terms of ecosystem services 
has similar qualitative features in the Mad Max scenario, but the losses are lower in the long 
run.  What is surprising is that, while Mad Max leads to a much greater degree of deforestation 
than Big Government, its total undiscounted costs over 300 years are actually smaller; $31tn 
against $51tn.  This reflects the differences in technological and policy assumptions that occur 
in each scenario, and hence the way in which ecosystem services are valued in each case. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the disaggregation of these losses into the seven categories of 
ecosystem service: climate regulation, gas regulation, waste assimilation, soil maintenance, 
disturbance/resilience, nutrient function and cultural values. Only four lines are shown in each 
case, though, as waste costs are identical to soil costs and both gas and disturbance costs are 
identical to climate costs.  Of these values, waste assimilation / soil maintenance are by far the 
most affected by deforestation. This is followed by gas / climate / disturbance regulation.  The 
least affected are the cultural values and nutrient recycling. 
 
[Insert Figures 4-5 around here] 
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6.  Results  
 
6.1. The local example 
 
Table 4 shows how the net present value of the long and short-rotation management 
approaches for forestry varies by discounting approach.  The first thing to notice is that using 
the standard environmental accounting approach with a constant market interest rate of 4% 
favours short-rotation forests.  Even if one uses the UK Treasury recommended SRTP, short-
rotation forests are preferred.  Using the normative approach, advocated by the Stern Review, 
the long-term payoffs of long-rotation forests and their associated biodiversity benefits are 
emphasised and their NPV is higher than the short-rotation alternative.  So the outcome of the 
analysis depends very much on whether one takes a positive view or a normative view of 
discounting. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
When it comes to declining discount rates, which for such long time horizons are argued to be 
more appropriate, the outcome of the NPV analysis depends not just on whether one takes a 
normative or a positive view, but also on whether one uses historical data or expert opinion in 
order to describe the uncertainty in the discount rate.  On the normative side, using Weitzman 
(2001) which, as shown by Figure 1, has a sharply declining schedule of discount rates, leads to 
a positive NPV for long-rotation, relatively biodiversity-rich, forests.  The Jouini and Napp (2010) 
approach does not, since although the schedule declines rapidly with the time horizon, it starts 
from a higher discount rate due to heterogeneity in expert opinions about growth and the pure 
rate of time preference.  On the positivist side, both the Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et 
al. (2007) approaches indicate that long-rotation forests are to be preferred.  However, if one 
assumes that experts were forecasting the future, rather than providing normative opinions, as 
do Freeman and Groom (2012), then the discount rate schedule barely declines and the NPV 
analysis favours short-rotation forests. 
 
This is a clear illustration that the evaluation of biodiversity benefits supplied by forests is 
strongly determined by the approach taken to discounting long time horizons.  However, by 
using the discount rate schedules of Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et al. (2007), which 
combine accountants’ natural preference for basing costs of capital on market interest rates with 
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a declining schedule estimated from historic Treasury bond yields, we can see that there is 
strong justification for choosing biodiversity-friendly long-rotation forestry practice in preference 
to planting pine.   
 
6.2. The global example 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the present value of each component of the ecosystem service under the 
two scenarios discussed: Mad Max and Big Government.  The rows present results for different 
schedules of discount rates, while the columns present the valuation for different components of 
the total ecosystem.  The final column, “Ratio”, provides the Total figure for that term structure 
divided by the Total figure for the flat 4% discount rate case. 
 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 around here] 
 
While the choice of scenario significantly affects each individual value, it has little effect on the 
relationship between different choices of discount rate and biodiversity valuation, which is the 
primary focus of interest in this paper.   
 
The lowest valuations are given by the two schedules of Freeman and Groom (2012), which 
have high (“Few experts”) and low (“Many experts”) correlation between expert forecasts, and 
the 4% flat rate.  This is because the short-term discount rate is around 4% in each case and 
the schedule either does not drop at all or declines very slowly. 
 
Using the recommendations of the UK and French governments leads to valuations between 
60% and 110% more than the 4% case respectively.  Similar increases in present values 
compared to the flat 4% rate are obtained from the normative approach of Jouini and Napp 
(2010).  Here the schedule declines at a similar, rapid rate to many other academic studies but 
starts from a higher initial value (see Figure 1).     
 
With valuations between 130% and 300% higher than the 4% case are the academic schedules 
of Weitzman (2001), Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et al. (2007).  The highest valuations 
of all, more than 400% higher than the 4% case, are derived with the discounting framework of 
the Stern Review (2007).  This is unsurprising as a very low discount rate (1.4%) is 
recommended at all horizons in this case. 
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The results show that using a flat discount rate at long-term average real bond yields has the 
potential to substantially understate the true social costs of biodiversity degradation.  This can 
be true whether one takes a positive perspective, like Newell and Pizer (2003), and Groom et al. 
(2007), or a normative approach, like Jounin and Napp (2010), and Weitzman (2001).   
 
Typically, conventional flat rate discounting using a market-based cost of capital will 
underestimate the social costs of biodiversity degradation.  This is in keeping with earlier 
findings concerning the Stern Review and the conclusions of SEEA (2011).  It should, though, 
be noted that the environmental accounting approach will, under certain circumstances, result in 
higher present values than the economic accounting approach.  For example, at the time of 
writing, the term structure of index-linked UK Treasury bonds is negative at all horizons.  A 
discount rate derived from this curve would be lower than any of the term structures considered 
above.  This, though, is an unusual situation and it is not obvious that a manager should use the 
current yield on a 30-year bond to value a 300 year cash flow in preference to the longer 
historical analysis of interest rates contained in, for example, Newell and Pizer (2003). 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have provided guidance to Full Cost Accountants concerning the appropriate 
choice of long-term discount rate.  We have then applied this guidance to both a local and a 
global biodiversity-sensitive project concerning forestry.   
 
Financial accounting conventions for valuing long-term liabilities, such as nuclear 
decomissioning expenses and pension fund obligations, prescribe the use of current market 
based discount rates, which are commonly interpreted to be the yields on AA-rated corporate 
bonds.  Our central observation is that these conventions are not appropriate for biodiversity- 
and environmentally-sensitive costs and benefits.  There are three main reasons for drawing 
this conclusion.  First, biodiversity-sensitive projects often have implications that stretch for 
many centuries, yet markets do not trade corporate bonds of this maturity.  Applying a 30-year 
bond yield to a 300-year cash flow is clearly problematic.  Second, financial market yields are 
influenced by the richest in society today, yet ecological decisions should reflect the attitudes of 
all, both today and in future generations.  Third, investor behaviour in financial markets is driven 
by a narrow desire to make money, which may not reflect the same individuals’ attitudes when 
considering the wider society and the environment. 
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To address these problems we have turned to the extensive literature within environmental 
economics on the long-term social rate of time preference (SRTP).  Two central observations 
emerge.  First, there is a deep divide between economists who think that the SRTP should be 
based on ethical judgements concerning intergenerational justice and those who, like financial 
accountants, prefer instead to look at financial markets.  This debate has been ongoing for 
decades and there is unlikely to be a swift resolution.  Fortunately, though, economists on both 
sides of this divide have now reached something of a concensus.  There is broad agreement 
that lower costs of capital should be used to discount long-term certainty-equivalent cash flows 
than their short-term equivalent counterparts. 
 
Given this, our recommendation is that Full Cost Accountants follow the proposed guidance of 
the US Environmental Protection Agency, which is currently considering its position on this 
issue.[8]  This points toward the use of declining discount rates based on historical interest rate 
data, such as those recommended by Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et al. (2007).  We 
believe that this approach may well also be best for company managers since it balances the 
accounting convention of basing costs of capital on observed market interest rates with a 
recognition of the benefits of declining discount rates.  If starting at a short-term real rate of 4%, 
this results in a recommendation of a real discount rate of 3.00% to be applied at 50 years, so 
that the present value of £1 in 50 years equals                      .  The real discount 
rate then declines further to 2.25% at 100 years, 1.50% at 200 years and 1.15% at 300 years.   
 
This recommendation will help socially responsible companies capture, in financial terms, the 
full social benefits of retaining a diverse biosphere.  As we have shown, this leads to a robust 
justification for opting for the planting of long-term oak forests in preference to pine; a decision 
that would not generally be reached under current financial accounting conventions.     
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Endnotes 
[1] There are surprisingly few analyses of this type in the literature.  Prior to TEEB (2011), 
which we discuss in Section 3, important exceptions include Hepburn and Koundouri 
(2007), who looked at the implications of using declining discount rates on forest policy.  
Hepburn et al. (2010) analyse behavioural issues associated with the use of DDRs on 
fishery management, while in a similar context Ludvig et al. (2005) analyse specific issues 
concerning discount rates, again in a natural resource modelling context.  These papers 
are not concerned specifically with ecosystem values and the importance of discounting 
for the far-distant time horizons associated with biodiversity conservation, which is our 
focus of attention here. 
[2] Appealing to environmental economics to improve Full Cost Environmental Accounting 
methods is not, in itself, a novel concept.  For example Herbohn (2005) conducts an 
environmental accounting experiment which is “based on a damage cost reporting system 
in which net profit is adjusted for positive and negative estimates of environmental 
externalities using valuation techniques from environmental economics.” (p.519).   Where 
this study differs methodologically from previous work is that our focus is on the discount 
rate component of the net present value calculation rather than estimates of the relevant 
monetised environmental costs and benefits. 
[3] This excludes any real option values that might arise from undertaking the project. 
[4] We explicitly exclude discussions of risk premia from our analysis by assuming that the 
environmental benefits are ‘zero-beta’.  As we will see, there are many challenges to face 
even in a risk-free world.  Alternatively, we can view    as being a certainty-equivalent 
monetary value.  This is consistent with the view of Zeckhauser and Viscusi (2008, p. 96) 
that “economists generally agree that whoever is the decision maker, the discount rate 
should not be adjusted for risk. The preferred approach, roughly speaking, is to address 
risk by converting monetary payoffs to certainty equivalents and then do the discounting.” 
[5] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp (accessed 21 January 2013). 
[6] The theoretical basis for the ENPV approach can be found in Gollier and Weitzman (2010) 
and Traeger (2012), among others. Other extensions of this essential principle can be 
found in Arrow et al. (2012). 
[7] Boumans et al. (2002) provides more information on the workings of the GUMBO model.  
Such is the scope of the model that it would be impossible to present a comprehensive 
equation-by-equation description with such limited space.  The STELLA model, upon 
which the GUMBO model runs, is available as freeware at: 
http://www.iseesystems.com/softwares/Player/iseePlayer.aspx.  The GUMBO model can 
be downloaded from: http://ecoinformatics.uvm.edu/projects/the-gumbo-model.html (both 
accessed 21 January 2013). 
[8] http://rff.org/Events/Pages/Intergenerational-Discounting-Workshop.aspx (accessed 21 
January 2013). 
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Table 1: Declining Discount Rates      
Discount Rate Scenarios t = 1 t = 25 t = 100 t = 200 t = 400 
1% 0.99 0.78 0.37 0.14 0.02 
5% 0.95 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Average Discount Factor 0.97 0.53 0.19 0.07 0.01 
Certainty Equivalent Discount Rate 2.98% 2.52% 1.67% 1.35% 1.17% 
 
This table presents a simple illustrative example showing that the certainty equivalent discount 
rate, when calculated from the expected net present value criterion, falls towards the lowest 
possible value as the time horizon approaches infinity. 
 
Table 2: Cash Flows and Biodiversity Values: Long versus Short Rotations 
 
Short Rotation 
(22 Years) 
Long Rotation 
(120 Years) 
Activity Years Cash Flow Years Cash Flow 
Site preparation 0 -50 0 -100 
Planting and tree protection 0 -200 0 -800 
Road construction 0, 12 -75 0 , 12 -75 
Annual operating costs 0 - 22 -20 0 - 120 -20 
Weed control 1 -50 1 -100 
Pre-commercial thinning 4, 7, 10, 13 -15 5, 20 -200 
Thinning 1 8 200 60 4000 
Thinning  12 350 80 8000 
Thinning 3 16 500 100 10000 
Clearfall 22 4000 120 12000 
Biodiversity values 0-22 0 20 - 120 120 
 
This table presents the cash flows for use in our local case study of forestry biodiversity benefits 
in the UK.   
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Table 3: Parameter Values for Simulation Scenarios 
 Big Government Mad Max 
Agriculture (crops)   
Effect of Energy on Plant Harvest 0.3 0.2 
Effect of Energy on Yields 0.04 0.02 
   
Savings Rates   
Human capital 0.18 0.05 
Natural capital 0.3 0 
Physical capital 0.1 0.2 
   
Resources   
Accessible Oil 800 600 
Assimilation Capacity 7000 3000 
 
This table presents key parameter choices for the two simulations that we run within GUMBO.   
 
Table 4: Present Value of Forestry and Biodiversity: Long versus Short Rotations 
  
Long Rotation  
(120 Year)  
Short Rotation 
(22 Years) 
Difference 
Discounting Approach Panel A: Flat Term Structure 
Flat 4% 898.6 2652.9 -1754.3 
 Panel B: Policy Recommendations 
UK Treasury "Green Book" 2467.9 3541.6 -1073.7 
French Government 3464.8 3681.1 -216.3 
Stern (2007, Flat 1.4%) 12118.0 8738.0 3380.0 
 Panel C: Normative Declining Discount Rate Schedule 
Weitzman (2001) 4255.3 4217.0 38.3 
Jouini and Napp (2010) 2510.0 3150.0 -640.0 
 Panel D: Positive Declining Discount Rate Schedule 
Newell and Pizer (2003) 4076.8 3688.0 388.8 
Groom et al. (2007) 5962.4 5302.5 659.8 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Many Experts 887.7 2642.6 -1754.9 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Few Experts 775.1 2464.3 -1689.2 
 
This table presents the present value of long rotation and short rotation forestry practices in the 
UK under ten different schedules of discount rates.  
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Table 5: "Mad Max" 
         Discounting Approach Gas Climate Disturbance Soil Nutrient Waste Cultural Total Ratio 
  Panel A: Flat Term Structure 
Flat 4% 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.273 0.020 0.273 0.071 1.084 1.00 
  Panel B: Policy recommendations 
UK Treasury "Green Book" 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.457 0.034 0.457 0.112 1.788 1.65 
French Government 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.572 0.045 0.572 0.135 2.228 2.05 
Stern (2007, Flat 1.4%) 0.831 15.174 1.355 13.512 1.356 13.502 1.361 13.474 12.43 
  Panel C: Normative declining discount rate schedule 
Weitzman (2001) 0.361 0.361 0.361 0.696 0.054 0.696 0.161 2.698 2.49 
Jouini and Napp (2010) 0.246 0.246 0.246 0.467 0.036 0.467 0.111 1.822 1.68 
  Panel D: Positivist declining discount rate schedule 
Newell and Pizer (2003) 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.977 0.079 0.977 0.211 3.734 3.44 
Groom et al. (2007) 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.880 0.069 0.880 0.202 3.404 3.14 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Many 
Experts 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.272 0.020 0.272 0.071 1.080 1.00 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Few Experts 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.258 0.019 0.258 0.067 1.024 0.94 
 
This table presents the present value of the loss of ecosystems services under the Mad Max scenario in trillions of dollars.  Ten 
different schedules of discount rates are used.  The “Ratio” figure gives the Total present value under each scenario divided by the 
Total present value under the 4% flat discount rate schedule.   
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Table 6: "Big Government" 
         Discounting Approach Gas Climate Disturbance Soil Nutrient Waste Cultural Total Ratio 
  Panel A: Flat Term Structure 
Flat 4% 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.469 0.046 0.469 0.078 1.791 1.00 
  Panel B: Policy recommendations 
UK Treasury "Green Book" 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.739 0.074 0.739 0.128 2.842 1.59 
French Government 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.885 0.089 0.885 0.157 3.407 1.90 
Stern (2007, Flat 1.4%) 1.221 1.221 1.221 2.397 0.244 2.397 0.435 9.286 5.19 
  Panel C: Normative declining discount rate schedule 
Weitzman (2001) 0.539 0.539 0.539 1.072 0.108 1.072 0.191 4.130 2.31 
Jouini and Napp (2010) 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.730 0.073 0.730 0.128 2.804 1.57 
  Panel D: Positivist declining discount rate schedule 
Newell and Pizer (2003) 0.843 0.843 0.843 1.692 0.167 1.692 0.315 6.470 3.61 
Groom et al. (2007) 0.669 0.669 0.669 1.324 0.134 1.324 0.237 5.113 2.86 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Many 
Experts 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.467 0.046 0.467 0.078 1.782 1.00 
Freeman and Groom (2012) Few Experts 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.437 0.043 0.437 0.073 1.666 0.93 
 
This table presents the present value of the loss of ecosystems services under the Big Government scenario in trillions of dollars.  
Ten different schedules of discount rates are used.  The “Ratio” figure gives the Total present value under each scenario divided by 
the Total present value under the 4% flat discount rate schedule. 
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Figure 1.  This graph presents the schedule of many different discount rates over a 300 year horizon.  “Green Book” is the 
recommendation from the UK Treasury (2006), while “French” corresponds to current French Government recommendations.  
“Gamma” is the gamma discounting schedule of Weitzman (2001).  This, and the Jouini and Napp (2010; J&N) schedule, are from a 
normative framework.  The schedules of Newell & Pizer (2003; N&P), Groom et al. (2007) and Freeman and Groom (2012; F&G) are 
in the positivist framework, with the final one refering to the case where there is high correlation between expert forecasts (correlation 
coefficient of 0.99). 
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Figure 2.  This figure presents the annual loss of forests under the Mad Max and Big Government scenarios in millions of hectares 
(mHa) that arises from a once and for all immediate increase in global deforestation of 0.01%.  The total losses are approximately 
100 mHa and 40 mHa respectively, representing 1% and 0.8% of global forest cover respectively.   
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Figure 3.  This figure presents the total loss of ecosystem services under the two scenarios expressed in trillions of dollars.  The 
numbers have been polynomially smoothed in this graph for presentation purposes, but the raw data are used when calculating net 
present values.  The total, undiscounted, costs over 300 years are $51.3tn for Big Government and $31.3tn for Mad Max.  
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Figure 4.  This figure presents the breakdown of the loss of ecoystem services by category for the Mad Max scenario.  Figures are 
presented in $tn after polynomial smoothing.  Three other categories of costs are not shown.  Waste costs are identical to Soil costs 
and both Gas and Disturbance costs are identical to Climate costs. 
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Figure 5.  This figure presents the breakdown of the loss of ecoystem services by category for the Big Government scenario.  
Figures are presented in $tn after polynomial smoothing.  Three other categories of costs are not shown.  Waste costs are identical 
to Soil costs and both Gas and Disturbance costs are identical to Climate costs 
 
 
 
